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The writer suggests that the court correctly distinguished
the instant case from the cases involving dismissal of public
employees. In the interest of public safety and welfare some
inquiry must be made into the character of the public employee.
If the employee does not cooperate in this examination of his
character, then he has not qualified himself as a public servant.
However, the status of the attorney is not "public employment"
but is a "public trust." If such status is to be denied the attorney
for refusing to disclose his subversive activities, this denial
should come from the client and not from the public authority.
It is an entirely different matter, however, when membership
in a subversive organization is proved. In that case the attorney
is no longer qualified to hold this "public trust."
Jerry G. Jones
PROPERTY -

CEMETERIES -

DEDICATION -

PRESCRIPTION

In 1895 a tract of land was sold to one of defendant's authors
in title subject to a reservation of a portion of the land as a
public graveyard. This reservation was included in every subsequent act of sale. No formal acceptance was made or other
action taken by the governing authorities, but since 1895 the
land has been used by the general public as a cemetery. Plaintiffs, relatives of deceased persons interred in the cemetery,1
brought an action to establish the boundary between the cemetery and defendant's land, alleging ,that defendant had appropriated a portion of the cemetery property. Defendant pleaded
the acquisitive prescription of thirty years, which was sustained
by the trial court. On appeal, held, reversed. The reservation in
the original act of sale, combined with the public use of the
cemetery for more than half a century, constituted an effective dedication of the land to public use. Land dedicated for use
conviction should be by an American process, that is, charge, try, prove, and
convict on the basis of time-honored tradition of democratic precepts. The state
has failed to establish a "preponderance of evidence" which would justify disbarment. 82 So.2d 657, 667 (Fla. 1952).
1. Defendant contested the plaintiffs' right to sue, but the court, relying on
Humphreys v. Bennett Oil Corp., 195 La. 531, 197 So. 222 (1940), in which
the same problem was presented, found that plaintiffs' personal interest in preserving the cemetery as a burial place for members of their family and in being
buried alongside their departed relatives gives them standing to sue. For earlier
cases granting citizens the right to sue where "public things" were involved, see
Sheen v. Stothart, 29 La. Ann. 630 (1877); Morgan v. Lombard, 26 La. Ann.
462 (1874) ; Burthe v. Fortier, 15 La. Ann. 9 (1860) ; Allard v. Lobau, 2 Mart.
(N.S.) 317 (1824).
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by the general public is classified as a public thing and is not
alienable, nor susceptible of private ownership, whether the purported acquisition be by estoppel, prescription, or otherwise.
Locke v. Lester, 78 So.2d 14 (La. App. 1955).
The instant case raises once again the problem of dedication
of land to public use. There are two aspects of that problem,
namely, what action is required to effect a dedication and, once
dedication is accomplished, what will be its effects. Most of the
difficulty has been caused by a failure to distinguish between
the various forms of dedication. 2 There are two basic types of
dedication, namely, formal or statutory dedication and common
law dedication. 3 The requirements for a formal or statutory
type of dedication are set out in R.S. 33:314 and 33:5051. 5 The
purpose of these statutes is to establish the method by which
towns and subdivisions may be created. R.S. 33:5051 requires
recordation of a full description of the land to be included in
the subdivision and a formal dedication of the various "streets,
alleys and public squares or plats." However, the courts have
held that "substantial compliance" with the requirements of the
statute is all that is necessary. 6 Thus, the mere recordation of
a map or plat will be sufficient to constitute a dedication of
2. One of the areas in which difficulty has arisen has been in distinguishing
the many methods by which the public may acquire rights in roads and streets.
For a discussion of this problem, see Comment, Establishment and Termination of
Public Rights in Roads and Streets in Louisiana, 16 LouISIANA LAW REVIEW
521 (1956).
3. The following cases have noted the types of dedication: B. F. Trappey's
Sons, Inc. v. City of New Iberia, 225 La. 466, 73 So.2d 423 (1954) ; Collins v.
Zander, 61 So.2d 897 (La. App. 1952) ; Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co. v. Parker
Oil Co., 190 La. 957, 183 So. 229 (1938) ; Bomar v. Baton Rouge, 162 La. 342,
110 So. 497 (1926).
4. LA. R.S. 33:31 (1950) : "If any person desires to found a city, town or
village on his land, he shall cause a survey of the land to be made and file a plat
thereof . . . in the office of the recorder of the parish in which the land is situated
. . . giving the names of the city, town or village to be founded; and exhibiting
its streets, alleys, sidewalks, or paths, squares, if any, blocks and lots . . . . He
shall further execute and cause to be recorded . . . an act in which he dedicates
the use of . . . the public squares, if any, for the purposes of recreation and for
the purpose of being ornamented with shrubberies and shade trees."
5. LA. R.S. 33:5051 (1950) : "Whenever the owner of any real estate desires
to lay off the same into squares or lots with streets or alleys between the squares
or lots, . . . he shall . . . cause the real estate to be surveyed and platted or subdivided by a licensed surveyor or civil engineer . . . and cause to be made and
filed in the office of the keeper of notarial records . . . a correct map of the
real estate so divided, which map shall contain the following: . . . (5) The name
or number of each square or plat dedicated to public use ... (7) A formal dedication made by the owner or owners of the property or their duly authorized agent
of all the streets, alleys and public squares or plats shown on the map to public
use."
6. Metairie Park v. Currie, 168 La. 588, 122 So. 859 (1929) ; Life v. Griffith,
197 So. 646 (La. App. 1940).
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the roads, streets or other public places indicated thereon ;7 there
is no requirement that there be an acceptance by the public."
Statutory dedication vests title to the property in the municipality or political subdivision in which the property is located.9
Whether or not a tract of land may be dedicated as a cemetery
in this manner has never been determined, but the language of
the statutes seems broad enough to permit provision for public
cemeteries to be made by this method. 10 The second type of
dedication is common law dedication." Although no particular
form is required to effect this type of dedication, 12 there must

be some definite indication of the owner's intention to dedicate
his land to the public. 13 To complete this type of dedication there
must be an acceptance by the public.' 4 However, this acceptance
need be in no particular form and it has been held that the mere
use of the land by the public for the purpose intended will be
sufficient. 5 A distinction appears to have been made in the
7. Collins v. Zander, 61 So.2d 897 (La. App. 1952).
8. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co. v. Parker Oil Co., 190 La. 957, 183 So. 229
(1938).
9. Ibid.
10. See notes 4 and 5 supra.
11. See note 3 supra. The term "common law dedication" was used in
Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co. v. Parker Oil Co., 190 La. 957, 183 So. 229 (1938).
Prior to the enactment of LA. R.S. 33:31 and 33:5051 (1950) the courts did not
find it necessary to distinguish the various types of dedication. It was merely
stated that no particular form was required to effect a dedication of land to the
public; all that was required was an intention to dedicate land to the public. See
Sheen v. Stothart, 29 La. Ann. 630 (1877) ; Shreveport v. Walpole, 22 La. Ann.
526 (1870) ; Baton Rouge v. Bird, 21 La. Ann. 244 (1869) ; Pickett v. Brown,
18 La. Ann. 560 (1866) ; Burthe v. Fortier, 15 La. Ann. 9 (1860). These cases
merely recognize the common law theory which was accepted by the Louisiana
courts early in the history of this state. See De Armas v. New Orleans, 5 La. 132
(1833), recognizing the ideas expressed in Cincinnati v. White's Lessee, 31 U.S.
(6 Pet.) 431 (1832). This theory was not very different from the doctrine previously recognized in this state and which appears to have survived from Spanish
jurisprudence. See Mayor of New Orleans v. Gravier, 11 Mart.(O.S.) 620 (1822),
referring to a case decided under Spanish rule and reaching the same result. LA.
R.S. 33:31 and 33:5051 (1950) merely appear to be recognition of the established
jurisprudence to the effect that the filing of a map or plat and sale of land with
reference to the public places marked thereon constitutes an effective dedication
of the land to the public. But an acceptance by the public is required. See cases
cited in this note supra. Since R.S. 33:31 and 33:5051 (1950) are limited in scope
to the situation in which a town or subdivision is being created, it would seem
that in other areas the prior jurisprudence is still applicable.
12. New Orleans v. Carrollton Land Co., 131 La. 1092, 60 So. 695 (1913)
Sheen v. Stothart, 29 La. Ann. 630 (1877) ; Shreveport v. Walpole, 22 La. Ann.
526 (1870) ; Baton Rouge v. Bird, 21 La. Ann. 244 (1869) ; Pickett v. Brown,
18 La. Ann. 560 (1866) ; Burthe v. Fortier, 15 La. Ann. 9 (1860) ; Mecobon,
Inc. v. Police Jury of Jefferson Parish, 70 So.2d 687 (La. App. 1954) ; Kemp
v. Town of Independence, 156 So. 56 (La. App. 1934) ; Town of Kenner v. Zito,
13 Orl. App. 465 (1916).
13. See cases cited note 12 supra.
14. See cases cited note 12 aupra.
15. See especially New Orleans v. Carrollton Land Co., 131 La. 1092, 60 So.
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jurisprudence between the effect
dedication of land for roads and
other uses. 16 In several cases' 7
common law dedication of roads

to be given the common law
streets and that of land for
the courts have held that a
and streets will vest only a

servitude of passage in the public. But where a common law
dedication of land for other uses is concerned, the cases indicate that the owner will be considered to have granted title of

the land to the public.'

Once title is granted to the municipality

or governing body by statutory dedication, or to the public by
19
common law dedication, the land becomes a "public thing."'

Whether it can thereafter be alienated or become the subject of

20
If
private ownership depends upon the use made of the land.
the land is to be available for the common use of all of the inhabitants of the community, it is not alienable nor susceptible

of private ownership, 21 unless it is subsequently abandoned by
695 (1913), where the mere failure to assess the property for taxes was held to
be an acceptance.
16. This distinction stems from the holding in Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co. v.
Parker Oil Co., 190 La. 957, 183 So. 229 (1938), to the effect that statutory
dedication passes title whereas common law dedication vests only a servitude. This
holding is based on common law authority. However, it appears to be limited to
roads and streets.
17. James v. Delery, 211 La. 306, 29 So.2d 858 (1947) ; Ford v. Shreveport,
204 La. 618, 16 So.2d 127 (1943) ; Collins v. Zander, 61 So.2d 897 (La. App.
1952).
18. McNeil v. Hicks & Howell, 34 La. Ann. 1090 (1882) ("open space")
Shreveport v. Walpole, 22 La. Ann. 526 (1870) ("open space") ; Livaudais v.
Municipality Number Two, 16 La. 509 (1840) ("colysee") ; Gleisse and Holland
v. Winter, 9 La. 149 (1836) (levee) ; Mecobon, Inc. v. Police Jury of Jefferson
Parish, 70 So.2d 687 (La. App. 1954) (park) ; Town of Kenner v. Zito, 13 Orl.
App. 465 (1916) (park).
19. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 453 (1870) : "Public things are those, the property of
which is vested in a whole nation, and the use of which is allowed to all the mem" LA. CIVIL CODE art. 454 (1870) : "Things which are for
bers of the nation ..
the common use of a city or other place, as streets and public squares, are likewise
public things."
20. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 482 (1870) : "Among those [things] which are not
susceptible of ownership, there are some which can never become the object of
it; as things in common, of which all men have the enjoyment and use.
"There are things, on the contrary, which, though naturally susceptible of
ownership, may lose this quality in consequence of their being applied to some
public purpose, incompatible with private ownership; but which resume this quality
as soon as they cease to be applied to that purpose; such as the high roads,
streets and public places."
21. Ibid. See New Orleans v. Salmen Brick and Lumber Co., 135 La. 828, 66
So. 237 (1914) (land in question held to be prescriptible but see discussion to
effect that municipal property dedicated to public use is not alienable or susceptible of private ownership) ; New Orleans v. Carrollton Land Co., 131 La.
1092, 60 So. 695 (1913) and Town of Vinton v. Lyons, 131 La. 673, 60 So. 54
(1912) (land dedicated to use as public parks is out of commerce and not alienable
by the city) ; Baton Rouge v. Bird, 21 La. Ann. 244 (1869) (land dedicated to
use as public squares is out of commerce and not susceptible of private ownership) ; Shreveport v. Walpole, 22 La. Ann. 526 (1870) ("open space" dedicated
to public use is out of commerce and not susceptible of individual or private ownership).,
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the public 22 or its use changed to some purpose not incompatible
with private ownership.3
In the instant case the court was presented the problem of
determining the effect of the reservations of land as a public
graveyard in the several acts of sale. It concluded that the
reservation in the original act of sale constituted a declaration
of the owner's intention to dedicate his land to the public. This
dedication was of the common law type, requiring an acceptance
by the public to be completed. The use of the land as a cemetery
by the public constituted such acceptance, completing the dedication and vesting title to the property in the public. 2 4 The land
thus became a "public thing"; and its use for the common benefit
of all of the inhabitants of the community rendered it inalienable
and insusceptible of private ownership. Although the situation
presented in the instant case was one of first impression, the
holding appears to be consistent with the prior jurisprudence
on this type of dedication. In other cases involving common
law dedication land has been given for public use as "open
space" next to a river for loading purposes 25 and for public
squares 20 and parks.2 7 There is no apparent reason why a public
cemetery may not be dedicated in this manner. It is submitted
that the court was correct in concluding that no part of the
cemetery tract could be acquired by a private individual, whether
by estoppel, prescription, or otherwise.
Edwin L. Blewer, Jr.

22. LA. R.S. 48:701 (1950).
23. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 482 (1870) New Orleans v. Salmen Brick and Lumber
Co., 135 La. 828, 66 So. 237 (1914) McNeil v. Hicks & Howell, 34 La. Ann.
1090 (1882).
24. Since the dedication was for a use other than as a road or street, it is
assumed that title passed.
25. McNeil v. Hicks & Howell, 34 La. Ann. 1090 (1822) ; Shreveport v. Walpole, 22 La. Ann. 526 (1870) ; Pickett v. Brown, 18 La. Ann. 560 (1866).
26. Baton Rouge v. Bird, 21 La. Ann. 244 (1869).
27. New Orleans v. Carrollton Land Co., 131 La. 1092, 60 So. 695 (1913)
Town of Kenner v. Zito, 13 Or. App. 465 (1916).

